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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ROLAND HOLMAN, an individual ] 
dba Andersen's Ford, Inc., ] 
and Andersen's Ford, Inc., a ] 
Utah corporation, ] 
Plaintiffs and Appellants,] 
vs. ] 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, ' 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & ] 
NEBEKER, a Utah Professional 
Corporation, ] 
Defendant and Appellee. 
I Case No. 940486-CA 
) Priority No. 15 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS 
The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction, including 
jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: (j) orders, judgments, 
and decrees of any court of record over which the Court of Appeals 
does not have original appellate jurisdiction. Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2-2. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
POINT I 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT A CLAIM 
AGAINST A DISSOLVED CORPORATION WHICH OCCURS MORE 
THAN TWO YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF DISSOLUTION IS, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, BARRED UNDER THE PROVISIONS 
§16-10-100 UTAH CODE ANN., (1953 as amended)? 
POINT II 
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF 
ROLAND HOLMAN, AS A MATTER OF LAW, COULD NOT BE A 
PROPER PARTY PLAINTIFF TO BRING THIS LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE ACTION? 
Applicable Standard of Appellate Review: 
Both of the issues are questions of law that this Court 
reviews for correctness giving no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions. This Court will affirm a trial court's decision to 
grant a motion to dismiss only if it appears the plaintiff cannot 
prove any set of facts in support of its claim. Dansie v. Anderson 
Lumber Co., et al.f 243 Ut. Adv. Rep. 18. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Constitutional Provisions: 
Article I, section 11 of the Utah Constitution provides: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this state, by himself or counsel any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
2 
Statutes: 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-100 provided: 
The dissolution of a corporation . . . shall not 
take away or impair any remedy available to or 
against the corporation . . . for any right or 
claim existing, or any liability incurred prior to 
such dissolution if action or other proceeding 
thereon is commenced within two years after the 
date of such dissolution. 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 16-10-101 provided: 
Notwithstanding the dissolution of a corporation . 
. . the corporate existence of such corporation 
shall nevertheless continue for the purpose of 
winding up its affairs . . . and to effect such 
purpose such corporation may . . . sue and be 
sued. 
Former Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-1405 (enacted 1992) 
provided: 
(2) Dissolution of a corporation does not: 
(e) prevent commencement of a proceeding by 
or against the corporation in its corporate name. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. These cases involve a claim 
against the defendant Callister, Duncan & Nebeker fka Greene, 
Callister & Nebeker, a Utah professional corporation, for legal 
malpractice which occurred during a Chapter 11 proceeding in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. 
Plaintiffs allege in their respective Complaints that 
defendant committed legal malpractice when it negligently failed to 
incorporate as part of the record in the Bankruptcy Court a 
settlement agreement between Andersen's Ford, Inc. and the Internal 
Revenue Service ("IRS"), a creditor in the bankruptcy case. 
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B. Course of Proceedings. Andersen's Ford, Inc., civil 
Case No. 93090413, was assigned to the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis, 
Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah. The defendant did not file an answer to the 
Complaint to dispute the merits of the case, but instead, filed a 
Motion to Dismiss and/or Motion for Summary Judgment. In its 
memorandum, defendant contended the case should be dismissed 
because under the provisions of §16-10-100, Utah Code Ann., (1953 
as amended), Andersen's Ford, Inc. as a dissolved corporation was 
required to file this action within two years of the date of order 
of dissolution, and this case was filed more than two years after 
the date of dissolution. Defendant further argued that as a 
dissolved corporation, Andersen's Ford, Inc. ceased to exist, 
consequently, the plaintiff had no standing to bring an action 
against defendant for legal malpractice. 
In response to these claims, plaintiff contended the 
provisions of §16-10-101 Utah Code Ann., (1953 as amended), which 
did not provide for any time limitation, was applicable to this 
case because the bankruptcy proceeding could be considered as part 
of the "winding up" of the affairs of the corporation. Plaintiff 
further asserted that §16-10-100 became a statute of repose because 
the cause of action in this case did not occur until after the two 
year period, and therefore, the statute unconstitutionally deprived 
it of its cause of action. Plaintiff also contended that 
defendant, as attorney for Andersen's Ford, Inc. was estopped from 
asserting this statute as a defense to a legal malpractice claim. 
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The case of Roland Holman, an individual, dba Andersen's 
Ford, Inc., civil Case No. 940090147, was assigned to the Honorable 
David S. Young, Judge of the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. As in the previous case, 
defendant did not file an answer to the Complaint to dispute the 
merits of the case, but instead, filed a Motion to Dismiss and/or 
Motion for Summary Judgment. 
In its memorandum, defendant contended Andersen's Ford, 
Inc. was the client of the law firm, and therefore, the real party 
in interest. Defendant then argued that if Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
was determined to be the real party in interest in the case, then 
the case must be dismissed on the grounds of res judicata based on 
the decision rendered by Judge Lewis. 
In response to this argument, plaintiff who had been doing 
business as Andersen's Ford, Inc., contended he was at least a 
successor in interest to any claim for legal malpractice. Further, 
that defendant was, in fact, also representing plaintiff Holman in 
the bankruptcy proceeding. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court. Judge Lewis, on 
November 1, 1993, entered a ruling that plaintiff's claim arose 
after dissolution stating that, fl[T]his Court cannot conclude that 
'windup' actions include initiative litigation." The Court, on 
December 21, entered an Order dismissing the case with prejudice. 
Judge Young granted the Motion to Dismiss, or in the 
Alternative Summary Judgment, and on May 5, 1994, entered an Order 
dismissing the case with prejudice. 
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It is the granting of these Motions to Dismiss which is the 
subject of this appeal. 
D. Statement of Facts Relevant to Issues Presented for 
Review. 
Plaintiff Andersen's Ford, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as 
the "Company") was a family corporation organized under the laws of 
the State of Utah, and was engaged in the business of owning and 
operating a retail Ford automobile dealership in Brigham City, 
Utah. (Addendum B) 
Plaintiff Roland Holman (hereinafter referred to as 
"Holman") was the president of the Company, and with the exception 
of a few shares in his family name, was the majority stockholder of 
the Company. 
The defendant (hereinafter referred to as "Callister") was 
an association of lawyers authorized to practice law in the State 
of Utah, and maintained its offices in Salt Lake City, Utah. The 
defendant was the attorney for both the Company and Holman 
personally. 
On September 30, 1982, the Company was involuntarily 
dissolved by the State of Utah for failure to pay state taxes. 
After the Order of Dissolution, the Company was not dissolved, but 
Holman, as president of the Company, continued to operate the 
business under the name of Andersen's Ford, Inc., and continued to 
use the defendant as its attorneys. (Holman record, pp. 107-108) 
Beginning in January 1979, the Company experienced severe financial 
problems and became indebted to the Internal Revenue Service 
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(hereinafter referred to as "IRS") for delinquent withholding taxes 
for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982. Holman, as president of the 
Company, was jointly liable with the Company to pay these taxes. 
(Addendum B) 
During the latter part of 1982 and into the early part of 
1983, the IRS kept demanding immediate payment of these taxes and 
threatened to seize the assets of both the Company and Holman to 
pay these taxes. In light of the IRS7 activity, Callister 
recommended filing a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in the 
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. The attorney advised 
Holman that such procedure would stop the IRS from attempting to 
collect the delinquent taxes, and allow the delinquent taxes to be 
paid under the supervision of the United States Bankruptcy Court. 
(Andersen record, pp. 81-82) 
Holman, as president of the company, and individually, 
agreed to proceed. Accordingly, on May 2, 1993, defendant filed in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah, a 
Chapter 11 proceeding in the name of Andersen's Ford, Inc., debtor, 
Case No. 83C-01222. Holman, as president of the Company, signed 
the Petition. Holman paid the filing expenses and attorneys' fees 
by check drawn on a bank account maintained in the name of 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
The IRS was designated as a creditor and filed a claim in 
the amount of $154,004.83, which was later amended to $127,403.09. 
These claims were disputed. Following the rules of the Bankruptcy 
Court, defendant filed a Plan of Reorganization for the 
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continuation of the business operations of the Company. The Plan 
provided in part that the claim of the IRS, the amount of which was 
not mentioned inasmuch as it had not been determined, would be paid 
over a period of five (5) years. 
After the Plan of Reorganization had been approved, a 
settlement was reached with the IRS for an amount of approximately 
$56,000, which represented payment in full of the delinquent taxes, 
interest, and penalties. The terms and conditions of the 
settlement are set forth in a letter dated November 4, 1984, signed 
by IRS Agent Hilton. 
The attorneys representing plaintiffs failed to include the 
settlement with the IRS as part of the record of the Bankruptcy 
Court by either incorporating the amount of the settlement in the 
Plan of Reorganization or by filing an appropriate petition or 
motion to obtain approval from the Bankruptcy Court of the 
settlement. As a result of this failure, the IRS, by letter to 
Holman dated October 27, 1990, demanded an additional amount of 
approximately $122,000 for payment of the taxes, interest, and 
penalties. 
Holman was unable to settle this claim with the IRS, and in 
order to resolve the matter, he was required to retain the services 
of another law firm in Salt Lake City to represent the Company and 
Holman in the bankruptcy case since Holman needed Callister as a 
witness to the negotiated settlement. This new law firm filed an 
adversary proceeding against the IRS seeking an order of the 
Bankruptcy Court enjoining the IRS from asserting this new claim on 
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the grounds and for the reasons that the IRS was bound by the terms 
and conditions of the settlement letter dated November 2, 1984. 
(Addendum B and C) 
After a bench trial, the Bankruptcy Judge, on December 23, 
1991, entered a decision in favor of the Company, with the 
exception of assessing an additional $21,000 taxes. (Andersen 
record, p. 40) The IRS appealed this decision to the United States 
District Court for the District of Utah, which appeal was denied on 
the June 4, 1992. Thereafter, the IRS filed a Notice of Appeal, in 
the United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit, which was 
finally withdrawn by the IRS on August 17, 1992. The bankruptcy 
case was ultimately closed in August of 1992. 
Plaintiffs then filed these lawsuits against the defendant 
alleging that defendant committed legal malpractice on or about 
November 2, 1984, when defendant negligently failed to incorporate 
in the record of the Bankruptcy Court the settlement agreement 
entered into with the IRS. Plaintiffs claimed that as a proximate 
result of this malpractice, they were damaged in the sum of 
$96,000, which represented $75,000 for the attorneys' fees and 
accountants' costs, and $21,000 assessed as additional taxes. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The legal malpractice action against Callister could have 
been brought by either Andersen's Ford, Inc. or Roland Holman. The 
trial courts erred in granting defendant's Motions to Dismiss. 
In dismissing the case, Judge Lewis failed to make findings 
of fact which reflected the basis for the Court dismissing the 
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case. The Court rejected the claim of plaintiff that the action 
against the defendant should be controlled by the provisions of 
§16-10-100. Therefore, the Court must have relied upon the two 
year limitation in §16-10-100 in dismissing the case. The claim 
having arisen after the expiration of the two years, makes the 
enforcement of the statute a Statute of Repose, and thus 
unconstitutional under Article I, Section 11 of the Utah 
Constitution. 
The defendant law firm is charged with knowledge of the 
provisions of §16-10-100, and in particular, its two year 
limitation. The defendant was aware the Corporation was dissolved, 
and that the impact of its representation in the bankruptcy 
proceeding would far exceed the two years. Under such 
circumstances, the defendant is legally and ethically barred from 
claiming the statute as a defense for legal malpractice which arose 
after the two years as a result of defendant's negligent 
performance of its duties in the Bankruptcy Court. 
The trial court erred in ruling that Holman could not be a 
proper party plaintiff. The Utah Supreme Court has found that 
"[E]ven in the absence of an express attorney-client relationship, 
circumstances may give rise to an implied professional relationship 
or a fiduciary duty toward the client, thereby invoking the ethical 
mandates governing the practice of law." Margulies by Margulies v. 
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 1985). Reaching this conclusion, the 
Court cited Hutton & Co v. Brown, 305 F.Supp. 371, 387-92 
(S.D.Tex.1971), in which the Federal Court implied a professional 
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relationship where an officer of a corporation reasonably believed 
that an attorney had represented him, although the attorney 
disclaimed any such relationship. The trial court erred when it 
dismissed the Holman case without first hearing whether there was 
an attorney-client relationship and then make appropriate findings 
of fact and conclusions of law.1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT A CLAIM 
AGAINST A DISSOLVED CORPORATION WHICH OCCURS MORE 
THAN TWO YEARS AFTER THE DATE OF DISSOLUTION IS, 
AS A MATTER OF LAW, BARRED UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF 
FORMER §16-10-100 UTAH CODE ANN., (1953 as 
amended). 
Article I Section 11 Declares That an Individual Shall Have 
a Right to a "Remedy by Due Course of Law" For Injury to "Person, 
Propertyf or Reputation". Specifically, that section states: 
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an 
injury done to him in his person, property or 
reputation, shall have remedy by due course of 
law, which shall be administered without denial or 
unnecessary delay; and no person shall be barred 
from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal 
in this state, by himself or counsel any civil 
cause to which he is a party. 
The injury involved in this case is the damages resulting 
from the legal malpractice committed by Callister in the Bankruptcy 
Court. The injury occurred on November 4, 1984, while Callister 
1
 Whether there was an attorney-client relationship is a 
question of fact that cannot properly be disposed of by summary 
judgment. U.R.C.P. 56. As stated in the facts, it is unclear 
whether the trial court granted the defendants motion to dismiss 
or motion for summary judgment. Since there were questions of fact 
presented, plaintiff proceeds under the assumption that the court 
granted a motion to dismiss. 
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was acting as counsel for the debtor Andersen Ford, Inc. in the 
United States Bankruptcy Court. Unfortunately, this legal 
malpractice was not discovered on that date. As in many cases, 
malpractice is not discovered until years after its occurrence. 
In this case, the parties and all creditors were subject to 
the jurisdiction of the Bankruptcy Court under the Plan of 
Reorganization the defendant had filed with the Court. It was only 
after completion of the plan that afforded creditors, such as the 
IRS, the opportunity to make demands upon the debtor. These 
demands by the IRS were determined to be invalid after protracted 
litigation in August 1992. It was after this time, that the 
plaintiffs had knowledge of the malpractice committed over twelve 
years previous. 
Having discovered the malpractice, plaintiff Andersen's 
Ford, Inc. filed its action in the District Court on July 14, 1993. 
The trial court ruled, however, that the claim is barred because it 
was not filed within two years of the date of dissolution of the 
corporation. This date would be May 1984, some six months prior to 
the malpractice act. Consequently, the Court, in dismissing the 
case, has violated the constitutional rights of the parties. 
Former Utah Code Ann. §§16-10-100 and 101 are 
unconstitutional as applied by Judge Lewis. In Berry by and 
through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1985), the Utah 
Supreme Court explained that Section 11 was designed to accomplish 
several purposes which include access to the courts and a judicial 
procedure that is based on fairness and equality. The Court 
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acknowledged that the framers intended that an individual cannot be 
arbitrarily deprived of effective remedies designed to protect his 
basic individual rights. 
Although this provision of the Utah Constitution has thus 
far been interpreted in the area of statutes of repose and statutes 
of limitations (see: Berry, supra, and Brown v. Weis, 871 P.2d 552 
(Utah 1994)) the reasoning is equally applicable to this factual 
scenario. As the Court discussed in Berryf "no one has a vested 
right in any rule of law." Id. at 675. 
However, once a cause of action under a particular 
rule of law accrues to a person by virtue of an 
injury to his rights, that person's interest in 
the cause of action and the law which is the basis 
for a legal action becomes vested, and a 
legislative repeal of the law cannot 
constitutionally divest the injured person of the 
right to litigate the cause of action to a 
judgment. Id. at 676. 
The defendant's argument appears to be that since the 
cause of action (legal malpractice) did not occur until two years 
after the corporation was dissolved, the corporation is estopped 
from seeking redress for its injury. The defendant then argues 
that the president of the dissolved corporation who is jointly 
liable for the damages caused by the defendant's negligence is 
estopped from seeking redress for his injury because the defendant 
denies that plaintiff enjoyed an attorney-client relationship with 
the defendant. This circular argument would serve to insulate the 
entire legal profession from legal malpractice claims made as a 
result of negligent services rendered to now dissolved 
corporations. 
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When Judge Lewis dismissed this case in reliance on former 
§16-10-100 or 101, those statutes became statutes of repose. Under 
Article I, Section 11, a statute of repose is unconstitutional 
unless it can survive the two part analysis set forth in Berry by 
and through Berry v. Beech Aircraft, 717 P.2d at 680 (Utah 1985). 
In Berry
 f the Court set forth a two-part analysis to 
determine whether the legislation abrogating a right properly 
accommodated Section 11. 
First, Section 11 is satisfied if the law provides 
an injured person an effective and reasonable 
alternative remedy "by due course of law" for 
vindication of his constitutional interest. The 
benefit provided by the substitute must 
substantially equal in value or other benefit to 
the remedy abrogated in providing essentially 
comparable substantive protection to one's person, 
property, or reputation, although the form of the 
substitute remedy may be different. 
Second, if there is no substitute or alternative 
remedy provided, abrogation of the remedy or cause 
of action may be justified only if there is a 
clear social or economic evil to be eliminated and 
the elimination of an existing legal remedy is not 
an arbitrary or unreasonable means for achieving 
the objective. Berry by and through Berry v. Beech 
Aircraft, 717 P.2d 670, 680 (Utah 1985). 
Under the Berry analysis, defendant's argument that the 
plaintiff is estopped from bringing the cause of action because the 
corporation has been dissolved or, in the alternative, because the 
president of that corporation does not have an attorney-client 
relationship must fail. First, the defendant's negligence occurred 
during the course of its representation of the Company and of 
Holman. However, the plaintiff's cause of action did not arise 
until several years later when the IRS demanded additional monies 
14 
and it became known that Callister had failed to incorporate the 
negotiated settlement into the bankruptcy proceeding. Chapter 16 
Utah Code Ann. as it existed until 19922 did not provide a 
substitute remedy for a cause of action that arose after the two-
year winding up period. 
Second, the Legislature must have had a clear social or 
economic evil it sought to eliminate when it abrogated the cause of 
action. It is here that the defendant's argument and the Court 
order fails because insulating attorneys from legitimate 
malpractice suits does not eliminate a clear social or economic 
evil. In fact, defendant must be legally and ethically estopped 
from asserting the provisions of former Section 16-10-100, Utah 
code Ann. as a defense to legal malpractice. 
Callister acknowledges that it was retained for the purpose 
of representing Andersen's Ford, Inc. in its reorganization under 
a Chapter 11 proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, and 
that it prepared that Chapter 11 plan. All during this period, 
defendant was aware of the dissolution of the corporation and had 
assured Holman that this did not affect its reorganization. 
As previously noted, the confirmed Plan of Reorganization 
prepared by Callister provided for ongoing activities of the 
corporation rather than a liquidation of the corporation. The Plan 
specifically provided that the claim of the IRS could be paid over 
2
 At the time the cause of action was filed, the statutory 
scheme had changed and now provided that corporate dissolution did 
not "prevent commencement of a proceeding by or against the 
corporation in its corporate name." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
1405(2)(e). 
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a period of five years, long after the two year period of 
limitations as set forth in former §16-10-100. If reinstatement of 
the corporation was necessary to protect plaintiff, then Callister 
should have made arrangements for such reinstatement. 
It is respectfully submitted that under such circumstances, 
and with the knowledge Callister had regarding the limitations in 
the statute, and that its duties would exceed the two years 
mentioned therein, is legally and ethically estopped from claiming 
the statute affords a defense to this legal malpractice claim. It 
would be inequitable for Callister to now take advantage of 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. and claim a statute protects Callister from 
a legal malpractice claim. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFF 
ROLAND HOLMAN, AS A MATTER OF LAW, COULD NOT BE A 
PROPER PARTY PLAINTIFF TO BRING THIS LEGAL 
MALPRACTICE ACTION. 
The case of Andersen's Ford, Inc. against Callister having 
been dismissed, and Judge Lewis, having failed to rule on the 
motion to substitute Roland Holman as party plaintiff, Roland 
Holman filed his action against Callister on January 7, 1994. 
Since the dissolution of Andersen's Ford, Inc. in September 
of 1982, Holman had been doing business under the name of 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. with the knowledge and blessing of Callister. 
Callister advised Holman that filing Chapter 11 Bankruptcy would 
stop the IRS's attempts to collect delinquent taxes, for which both 
Holman and the Company were jointly liable, and would allow the 
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taxes to be paid under the supervision of the United States 
Bankruptcy Court. Holman, individually and as president of the 
Company, agreed to this procedure. (Addendum B, p. 2; Anderson 
record, p. 101, par. 2.11) 
Holman respectfully submits that under such circumstances, 
it was error for Judge Young to rule, as a matter of law, that 
Holman was not a proper party plaintiff. Contrary to Judge Young's 
ruling, the Utah Supreme Court has held, an attorney/client 
relationship can arise through implication. 
In Margulies by Margulies v. Upchurch. 696 P.2d 1195 (Utah 
1985) states: "[E]ven in the absence of an express attorney-client 
relationship, circumstances may give rise to an implied 
professional relationship or a fiduciary duty toward the client, 
thereby invoking the ethical mandates governing the practice of 
law." Reaching this conclusion, the Court cited Hutton & Co v. 
Brown, 305 F.Supp. 371, 387-92 (S.D.Tex.1971) in which the Federal 
Court implied a professional relationship where an officer of a 
corporation reasonably believed that an attorney had represented 
him although the attorney disclaimed any such relationship. 
Although Ethical Consideration 5-18 of the Utah Code of 
Professional Responsibility (1977) states that an attorney 
representing a corporation or similar entity owes allegiance to the 
entity rather than to its shareholders, in Margulies, the Court 
modified that ethical consideration when the individual interests 
of the limited partners are directly involved. The Court found 
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that then there may be sufficient grounds for implying the 
existence of an attorney-client relationship. 
In this case, Roland Holman was the president and major 
stockholder of the corporation. Callister acted as counsel to the 
corporation but also acted as counsel to Holman individually 
insofar as he was jointly liable with the corporation. After the 
corporation was dissolved, Holman continued to do business as 
Andersen's Ford, Inc., and Callister continued to act as counsel 
thereto. It was Canister's negligence that caused Holman to incur 
$75,000 in legal fees and $21,000 additional taxes. It would be an 
effrontery to justice to deny both Holman and the dissolved 
Corporation a remedy for the injury they have suffered as a result 
of Callister's negligence. 
Defendant further contended that even if Andersen's Ford, 
Inc. is joined as a party plaintiff, the case must be dismissed 
under the doctrine of res judicata. Defendant's argument that the 
Plaintiff's claim was barred by res judicata is clearly misplaced. 
For a claim to be barred by res judicata, the prior claim 
and the current claim must have involved the same parties, and the 
first claim must have resulted in final judgment on the merits. 
In order for a claim to be barred by res judicata, 
both the prior claim and the current claim must 
meet three requirements: (1) both actions must 
involve the same parties, their privies or 
assignees; (2) the claim that is asserted to be 
barred must have been presented or be such that it 
could have been presented in the first case; and 
(3) the first suit must have resulted in a final 
judgment on the merits by a court of competent 
jurisdiction. 
D'Aston v. D'Aston, 844 P.2d 345 (Utah App. 1992). 
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Under D'Aston, the trial court erred when it found the 
Holman case was barred under the doctrine of res judicata because 
a question of fact was raised by the defendant as to whether 
plaintiffs are the same party; second, the claim was not presented 
in the first case; and third, there was no final judgment on the 
merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial courts in both of these actions erred when they 
dismissed the plaintiff's claims. Plaintiff Company has both the 
Utah Code and the Utah Constitution to support itself as a party 
plaintiff in this legal malpractice action. Plaintiff Holman has 
case law to support himself as a party plaintiff in this legal 
malpractice action. Plaintiff/Appellant respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse both trial judges' orders granting 
defendant's Motions to Dismiss and remand this matter for an 
appropriate hearing. 
Respectfully submitted this day of August, 1994. 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CALLISTER/ DUNCAN & NEBEKER, 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & 




CASE NO. 930904013 
A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with defendant's 
Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment, the Court having 
reviewed the Motion, Memorandum in support and Reply Memorandum and 
the Memorandum in opposition, and the Court being fully advised and 
finding good cause, rules as stated herein. 
The Motion to Dismiss is granted. This Court finds that under 
the uncontroverted facts, the plaintiff corporation was 
involuntarily dissolved in September of 1982 and plaintiff's claim 
arose after dissolution. This Court cannot conclude that "wind up" 
actions include initiative litigation. 
ANDERSEN'S FORD V. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER PAGE TWO RULING 
Counsel for defendant is to prepare an Order and detailed 
Findings consistent with the material facts referenced in the 
Memoranda, and consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this / ' day of November, 1993. 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
ANDERSEN'S FORD V. 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER PAGE TWO RULING 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct cgpy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this / day of 
November, 1993: 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Stephen G. Morgan 
Dennis R. James 
Attorneys for Defendant 
136 S. Main, 8th Floor 




STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC., a Utah : 
corporation, : STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
: AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, : 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & : 
NEBEKER, a Utah professional : Civil No. 930904013 
corporation, : 
: Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendant. : 
The following facts were undisputed by the parties for 
purposes of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss: 
UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Plaintiff Andersen's Ford, Inc. is a former Utah 
corporation which had its principal place of business in Brigham 
City, Utah. 
2. On September 30, 1982, Andersen's Ford, Inc. was 
involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah for failure to pay 
taxes. 
3. For the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, Plaintiff failed to 
pay a portion of its federal withholding taxes owing to the IRS. 
4. Prior to May 2, 1983, Plaintiff retained and employed 
Defendant to file and process a Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding in 
the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah. 
5. On or about May 2, 1983, Defendant, by and through its 
employees, filed on behalf of the Plaintiff the aforementioned 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding as Case No. 83C-01222. 
$• Plaintiff set forth in its Chapter 11 Plan of 
Reorganization Amended Disclosure Statement its purpose in filing 
as follows: 
2.11 The filing of Debtors Chapter 11 proceeding in 
May 1983 was necessitated by actions being taken by the 
Internal Revenue Service to seize and dispose of various 
assets of the Debtor in an effort to reduce the out-
standing for [sic] liability of the debtor for the period 
of 1980-1982. The tax liability is now to be paid 
pursuant to the terms of Debtors Plan of Reorganization, 
which will enable the Debtor to pay its delinquent taxes 
in installments over a period of five years, while 
maintaining itself as an ongoing, healthy business 
operation in the meantime. 
2.12 The Debtor believes that it has put itself on 
a sound financial footing, through its reduced debt 
structure and work force, that will allow it to more 
easily deal with fluctuations in the national or local 
economy. Debtor further submits that confirmation of the 
Plan filed by the Debtor is not likely to be followed by 
a liquidation of or need for further financial reorgani-
zation by the Debtor. 
7. The IRS filed a Proof of Claim, dated October 19, 1983, 
in Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and 
penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 in the amount of 
approximately $154,004.83. 
8. The IRS filed an amended Proof of Claim, dated August 28, 
1984, in Plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and 
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penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982 in the amount of 
approximately $127,403.09. 
9. Plaintiff disputed the IRS's Proofs of Claim and filed an 
Objection to the Amended Proof of Claim on August 29, 1984. 
i#. On October 4, 1984, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order 
confirming Plaintiff's Second Amended Plan. 
. t•'- t&. Pursuant to the confirmed Plan of Reorganization (the 
"Plan"), Plaintiff was to make the following payments to IRS; 
a. On the first anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
b. On the second anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
c. On the third anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
d. On the fourth anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
e. On the fifth anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest. 
3^. The IRS participated in the Plan confirmation hearing and 
had knowledge of the terms and conditions of the Plan confirmed by 
the Court. 
y^. At the time the Plan was confirmed, the amount of the 
claim of the IRS against Plaintiff for unpaid taxes for the years 
1980, 1981 and 1982 had not been resolved. The Plan did not 
specify the amount of tax liability Plaintiff owed for said years. 
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14. Both before and after the order confirming the Plan, 
Plaintiff and the IRS had numerous communications and exchanged 
information in an effort to determine Plaintiff's tax liability. 
The IRS possessed all relevant information and facts regarding the 
tax liability owed to it by Plaintiff. The IRS also knew which 
credits should have been applied to Plaintiff's account. 
' j'k 1)5. On or about November 2, 1984, the IRS, through its agent 
Clesse Hilton ("Hilton"), acting within the apparent scope of his 
authority and with the approval of his supervisor, wrote a letter 
("Hilton Letter") to Plaintiff in which the IRS stated, among other 
things, that the balance due as of November 15, 1984, for tax and 
accrued interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $58,630.76. 
The determination of this amount was based on Hilton's independent 
review of the account records and documents reflecting taxes owing 
and payments made, and upon information supplied to Hilton by 
Plaintiff. 
ljfc. By the Hilton Letter the IRS also agreed to abate all 
penalties for tax years 1980, 1981 and 1982, upon payment of 
$58,630.76, together with interest. 
1*7. The amount set forth in the Hilton Letter was not the 
result of an attempt on Hilton's part to compromise Plaintiff's 
liability, but was his independent determination of the actual 
amount of tax and interest due. He was authorized to abate 
penalties upon payment of the tax and interest in full. 
ltk Plaintiff accepted the amounts set forth in the Hilton 
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Letter as the actual amount it owed because the sums represented 
came within $1,000.00 of the amount Plaintiff calculated that it 
owed to the IRS. 
I 19^ On or about April 16, 1985, Robert S. Prince ("Prince"), 
the attorney employed by Defendant and handling the Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy for Plaintiff, telephoned the IRS to confirm the 
agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter. The IRS through its 
agent James Richards ("Richards"), acting within the scope of his 
apparent authority, wrote a letter to Prince in which the IRS 
stated, among other things, that the balance due as of April 15, 
1985, for taxes and interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was 
$61,715.41. Although Prince did not specifically refer to the 
Hilton Letter during the phone call, the figure quoted by Richards 
represented the amount set forth in the Hilton Letter, plus accrued 
interest. 
7fa. On or about April 17, 1985, Prince sent a letter to the 
IRS in which he confirmed that the balance owing as of April 15, 
1985, for taxes assessed during 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $61,715.41. 
Prince reiterated the agreement that upon payment of said sum all 
pre-petition tax liability of Plaintiff would be satisfied. 
2X. The IRS did not respond or object to Prince's April 17, 
1985 letter. 
22. After the agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter was 
reached between Plaintiff and the IRS, Plaintiff made payments to 
the IRS that it intended to be applied according to the Plan and 
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the agreement. 
2^. Plaintiff made its first payment in August of 1985 in the 
/ 
amount of $40,000. The payment prepaid the obligation according to 
the terms of the payment schedule in the confirmed plan. Plaintiff 
paid an additional $15,000 to the IRS in December of 1988. 
2^. Between 1985 and 1990, the IRS did not declare a default 
or otherwise indicate to Plaintiff that it was in default under the 
Plan or that the IRS expected payment to have been made immediately 
after the agreement was reached in November 1984. 
^5. On several occasions between 1984 and mid-1990, the IRS 
attempted to collect the tax liability owed by Plaintiff or from 
Roland Holman, an officer of Plaintiff, as a responsible party. 
Each time the IRS was informed that Plaintiff was paying according 
to the Hilton Letter and the Plan. 
The IRS maintained an active collection ledger on 
Plaintiff between 1984 and 1990, with a variety of agents responsi-
ble for monitoring the account. 
itf'. Clark Hoi felt z ("Holfeltz") , a revenue agent, reviewed 
the collection on the account in 1988. He suspected that certain 
of the payments had been misapplied and questioned whether 
Plaintiff had complied with the Plan. Holfeltz reconciled the 
account and no notice of default was served upon Plaintiff. 
28. Plaintiff received a letter dated October 27, 1990, 
wherein the IRS informed Plaintiff that it had recomputed Plain-
tiffs tax liability and $127,644.31 was due on the alleged default 
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of the Chapter 11 Plan. The IRS also demanded payment of the new 
amount and threatened to pursue a motion to set aside the order of 
confirmation or move to convert the case to a Chapter 7. After 
October 27, 1990, the IRS posited a variety of other figures 
representing the amount due based on various methods of applying 
payments made on the debt. 
29. Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief and 
injunction against the IRS in the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the State of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 83C-01222 (the 
"Declaratory Judgment Action") to have Plaintiff's obligation to 
the IRS declared to be paid in full and to enjoin further collec-
tion efforts. 
The IRS alleged in its Trial Brief in that case that 
because Plaintiff breached its agreement with the IRS (even 
assuming the enforceability of the Hilton Letter and of the payment 
schedule under the Plan) by failing to make the agreed to payments, 
it was entitled to renew its claim to the full tax liability of the 
Plaintiff, including penalties and interest. 
31. Plaintiff prevailed in the Declaratory Judgment Action, 
the court there ruling that the Hilton Letter was binding on the 
IRS. 
32. In spite of the favorable result, Plaintiff brought this 
action to attempt to recover from Defendant its fees and costs 
incurred in pursuing the Declaratory Judgment Action. 
M 
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Plaintiff corporation was involuntarily dissolved in 
September of 1982. 
2. Plaintiff's claim arose after dissolution. 
3. Plaintiff's claims cannot be considered "wind-up" actions 
of a corporation. 
DATED this day of November, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM; 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
C:\UP51\ANDERSEN\4198.FF 8 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2315 
DENNIS R. JAMES, No. 1642 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & 




Civil No. 930904013 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Based on the Undisputed Facts and the Conclusions of Law, 
Defendant's Motion for Dismissal is granted and Plaintiff's action 
is hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
DATED this day of November, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
JUDGE LESLIE A. LEWIS 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
C:\WP51\ANDERSEN\4198.0R 
CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this.oQ day of November, 1993, I caused a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED 
FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand delivered to the following: 
Richard C, Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 





STEPHEN G. MORGAN, No. 2 315 
CYNTHIA K.C. MEYER, No. 5050 
MORGAN & HANSEN 
Kearns Building, Eighth Floor 
136 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 531-7888 
Attorneys for Defendant 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROLAND HOLMAN, an individual, : 
dba Andersen's Ford, Inc., : STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
: AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : 
CALLISTER, DUNCAN & NEBEKER, : 
fka GREENE, CALLISTER & 
NEBEKER, a Utah professional : Civil No. 940900147 
corporation, : 
: Judge David S. Young 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to 
Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment. The Court 
considered the Motion and Memorandum filed by Defendant, Plain-
tiff's Memorandum in Opposition and the Affidavit of Roland Holman, 
as well as Defendant's Reply Memorandum. The Court denied the 
parties' requests for oral argument pursuant to Rule 4-501(3)(c) of 
the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. 
The following facts were undisputed by the parties for 
purposes of Defendant's Motion to Dismiss: 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
1. Andersen's Ford, Inc. is a former Utah corporation which 
had its principal place of business in Brigham City, Utah, 
2. On September 30, 1982, Andersen's Ford, Inc. was 
involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah for failure to pay 
taxes. 
3. On or about May 2, 1983, Defendant, by and through its 
employees, filed on behalf of Andersen's Ford a Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy Petition as Case No. 83C-01222. 
4. For the years 1980, 1981 and 1982, Andersen's Ford failed 
to pay a portion of its federal withholding taxes owing to the IRS. 
5. The IRS filed a Proof of Claim, dated October 19, 1983, 
in Andersen's Ford's bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, interest and 
penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 in the amount of 
approximately $154,004.83. 
6. The IRS filed an amended Proof of Claim, dated August 28, 
1984, in Andersen's Ford's bankruptcy proceeding for taxes, 
interest and penalties owing for the years 1980, 1981, and 1982 in 
the amount of approximately $127,4 03.09. 
7. Andersen's Ford disputed the IRS's Proofs of Claim and 
filed an Objection to the Amended Proof of Claim on August 29, 
1984. 
8. On October 4, 1984, the Bankruptcy Court entered an order 
confirming Andersen's Ford's Second Amended Plan of Reorganization 
(the "Plan"). 
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9. Pursuant to the confirmed Plan, Andersen's Ford was to 
make the following payments to IRS; 
a. On the first anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
b. On the second anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
c. On the third anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
d. On the fourth anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest; 
e. On the fifth anniversary of the effective date, 20% 
of its allowed claim plus accrued interest. 
10. The IRS participated in the Plan confirmation hearing and 
had knowledge of the terms and conditions of the Plan confirmed by 
the Court. 
11. At the time the Plan was confirmed, the amount of the 
claim of the IRS against Andersen's Ford for unpaid taxes for the 
years 1980, 1981 and 1982 had not been resolved. The Plan did not 
specify the amount of tax liability Andersen's Ford owed for said 
years. 
12. Both before and after the order confirming the Plan, 
Andersen's Ford and the IRS had numerous communications and 
exchanged information in an effort to determine Andersen's Ford's 
tax liability. The IRS possessed all relevant information and 
facts regarding the tax liability owed to it by Andersen's Ford. 
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The IRS also knew which credits should have been applied to 
Andersen's Ford's account. 
13. On or about November 2, 1984, the IRS, through its agent 
Clesse Hilton ("Hilton"), acting within the apparent scope of his 
authority and with the approval of his supervisor, wrote a letter 
("Hilton Letter") to Andersen's Ford in which the IRS stated, among 
other things, that the balance due as of November 15, 1984, for tax 
and accrued interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was 
$58,630.76. The determination of this amount was based on Hilton's 
independent review of the account records and documents reflecting 
taxes owing and payments made, and upon information supplied to 
Hilton by Andersen's Ford. 
14. By the Hilton Letter the IRS also agreed to abate all 
penalties for tax years 1980, 1981 and 1982, upon payment of 
$58,630.76, together with interest. 
15. The amount set forth in the Hilton Letter was not the 
result of an attempt on Hilton's part to compromise Andersen's 
Ford's liability, but was his independent determination of the 
actual amount of tax and interest due. He was authorized to abate 
penalties upon payment of the tax and interest in full. 
16. Plaintiff accepted the amounts set forth in the Hilton 
Letter as the actual amount it owed because the sums represented 
came within $1,000.00 of the amount Andersen's Ford calculated that 
it owed to the IRS. 
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17. On or about April 16, 1985, Robert S. Prince ("Prince"), 
the attorney employed by Defendant and handling the Chapter 11 
Bankruptcy for Andersenfs Ford, telephoned the IRS to confirm the 
agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter. The IRS through its 
agent James Richards ("Richards"), acting within the scope of his 
apparent authority, wrote a letter to Prince in which the IRS 
stated, among other things, that the balance due as of April 15, 
1985, for taxes and interest for the years 1980, 1981 and 1982 was 
$61,715.41. Although Prince did not specifically refer to the 
Hilton Letter during the phone call, the figure quoted by Richards 
represented the amount set forth in the Hilton Letter, plus accrued 
interest. 
18. On or about April 17, 1985, Prince sent a letter to the 
IRS in which he confirmed that the balance owing as of April 15, 
1985, for taxes assessed during 1980, 1981 and 1982 was $61,715.41. 
Prince reiterated the agreement that upon payment of said sum all 
pre-petition tax liability of Andersen's Ford would be satisfied. 
19. The IRS did not respond or object to Prince's April 17, 
1985 letter. 
20. After the agreement evidenced by the Hilton Letter was 
reached between Andersen's Ford and the IRS, Andersen's Ford made 
payments to the IRS that it intended to be applied according to the 
Plan and the agreement. 
21. Andersen's Ford made its first payment in August of 1985 
in the amount of $40,000. The payment prepaid the obligation 
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according to the terms of the payment schedule in the confirmed 
plan. Andersen's Ford paid an additional $15,000 to the IRS in 
December of 1988. 
22. Between 1985 and 1990, the IRS did not declare a default 
or otherwise indicate to Andersen's Ford that it was in default 
under the Plan or that the IRS expected payment to have been made 
immediately after the agreement was reached in November 1984. 
23. On several occasions between 1984 and mid-1990, the IRS 
attempted to collect the tax liability owed by Andersen's Ford from 
Roland Holman, an officer of Andersen's Ford, Inc., as a responsi-
ble party. Each time the IRS was informed that Andersen's Ford was 
paying according to the Hilton Letter and the Plan. 
24. The IRS maintained an active collection ledger on 
Andersen's Ford between 1984 and 1990, with a variety of agents 
responsible for monitoring the account. 
25. Clark Holfeltz ("Holfeltz"), a revenue agent, reviewed 
the collection on the account in 1988. He suspected that certain 
of the payments had been misapplied and questioned whether 
Andersen's Ford had complied with the Plan. Holfeltz reconciled 
the account and no notice of default was served upon Andersen's 
Ford. 
26. In 1990, the IRS took the position that because Ander-
sen's Ford breached its agreement with the IRS (even assuming the 
enforceability of the Hilton Letter and of the payment schedule 
under the Plan) by failing to make the agreed to payments, it was 
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entitled to renew its claim to the full tax liability of Andersenfs 
Ford, including penalties and interest. 
27. Andersen's Ford received a letter dated October 27, 1990, 
wherein the IRS informed Andersen's Ford that it had recomputed 
Andersen's Ford's tax liability and $127,644.31 was due on the 
alleged default of the Chapter 11 Plan. The IRS also demanded 
payment of the new amount and threatened to pursue a motion to set 
aside the order of confirmation or move to convert the case to a 
Chapter 7. After October 27, 1990, the IRS posited a variety of 
other figures representing the amount due based on various methods 
of applying payments made on the debt. 
28. Andersen's Ford brought an action for declaratory relief 
and injunction against the IRS in the United States Bankruptcy 
Court for the State of Utah, Central Division, Case No. 83C-01222 
(the "Declaratory Judgment Action") to have Andersen's Ford's 
obligation to the IRS declared to be paid in full and to enjoin 
further collection efforts. 
29. Andersen's Ford prevailed in the Declaratory Judgment 
Action, the court there ruling that the Hilton Letter was binding 
on the IRS. 
30. In spite of the favorable result, Andersen's Ford brought 
the action in Civil No. 930904013 to attempt to recover from 
Defendant its fees and costs incurred in pursuing the Declaratory 
Judgment Action. 
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31. Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss, or, in the Alterna-
tive, for Summary Judgment in Civil No. 930904013, which was 
granted. 
32. Despite the fact that Andersen's Ford's action in Civil 
No. 930904013 was dismissed with prejudice, Plaintiff herein, 
Roland Holman, filed a Complaint in this case alleging that since 
the corporation, Andersen's Ford, was dissolved on September 30, 
1982, Holman continued to operate the business under the trade name 
of Andersen's Ford, Inc., and to "remain a client of the Defen-
dant." 
33. Plaintiff herein, Roland Holman, was a creditor of 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
34. Plaintiff herein was represented to be an officer and 
director of Andersen's Ford in Andersen's Ford's bankruptcy. 
35. The Second Amended Plan of Reorganization contained a 
provision preventing the Internal Revenue Service from proceeding 
against Roland Holman to collect taxes, penalties or interest owed 
by Andersen's Ford, so long as Andersen's Ford was current on all 
payments owed to the IRS under the Plan. 
36. The Second Amended Plan of Reorganization was signed by 
Roland Holman in his capacity as President of Andersen's Ford, Inc. 
The signature block appears as follows on the Second Amended Plan: 
ANDERSEN'S FORD, INC. 
By: /s/ Roland Holman 
Its: /s/ President 
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Although Plaintiff disputes the following facts, the Court 
rules that there is no genuine issue as to the following, based on 
the materials submitted by the parties. Roland Holman's affidavit 
does not place the following facts in issue. In his Affidavit, 
Holman states he was virtually the sole shareholder of Andersen's 
Ford and directed Andersen's Ford's activities. Those facts do 
not, however, place in issue the following facts: 
37. Prior to May 2, 1983, Andersen's Ford retained and 
employed Defendant to file and process a Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Utah. 
38. It was the corporation, Andersen's Ford, Inc., and not 
Roland Holman, who remained a client of Defendant, and it was 
Andersen's Ford, Inc. on whose behalf Defendant filed a Chapter 11 
Petition in Bankruptcy. 
Based on the foregoing undisputed facts, the Court enters the 
following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Andersen's Ford, and not Plaintiff Roland Holman, is the 
real party in interest in this matter, and is an indispensable 
party to this action since it was the client of Defendant and owns 
any legal malpractice claim. 
2. Even if Andersen's Ford had been joined as a party 
plaintiff, the case would necessarily be dismissed based on the 
doctrine of res judicata, since Andersen's Ford's identical action 
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against Defendant was dismissed with prejudice in Case No. 
930904013, Third District Court for Salt Lake County. 
3. The Court should enter an Order dismissing Plaintiff's 
complaint with prejudice, and as such, the Court does not reach 
Defendant's alternative motion for summary judgment on the merits 
of the legal malpractice claim. 
DATED this day of April, 1994. 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE DAVID S. YOUNG 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
RICHARD C. DIBBLEE 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY 
I certify that on this O^—day of April, 1994, I caused the 
original of the foregoing proposed STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to be hand delivered to the following for 
his approval as to form: 
Richard C. Dibblee 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
10 West 300 South, Suite 500 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
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